From the 1857 Introduction to the 1867 Preface:Reflections on Marx’s method in the critique of political economy by Jessop, Bob
1 
 
From the 1857 Introduction to the 1867 Preface: Reflections on Marx’s Method in the 
Critique of Political Economy 
Bob Jessop 




Marx noted in the Preface to the 1867 edition of capital that beginning is difficult in all sciences. 
His work on this text reflected Marx and Engels’s view that there was only one science: history, 
embracing nature and society. Unsurprisingly, the natural sciences shaped their work in 
important ways. My article notes the impact of Darwinism, thermodynamics and cell biology 
in Marx’s analyses and examines the third of these in detail. When Marx eventually settled on 
the value-form of the commodity as his starting point in Capital, he described it as the 
economic cell form of the capitalist mode of production. This reflected a new step in his critique 
of political economy. For, in contrast to his account of two previous methods of political 
economy outlined in the 1857 Introduction, his subsequent interest in cell biology suggested a 
third method that would sublate and supersede them. The commodity provided the simplest, 
most apparent, and most immediate elementary unit of the capital relation and would serve 
both as a presupposition in his analysis and its eventual posit (result) as the analysis unfolded 
all its contradictory and dynamic implications for the logic of capital. This reflects his re-
reading of Hegel’s Science of Logic, which was also concerned with the choice of starting point 
in exploring an organic totality. The cell analogy was useful as Marx sought the best starting 
point for his critique. In this context, I identify six parallels between cell biology and Marx’s 
analysis of the capitalist mode of production that might have influenced his starting point and 
subsequent analysis. But they remain analogies and did guided neither his substantive research 
nor its presentation, which reflects the historical specificities of the capital relation. The article 
ends with some general conclusions on discovery, methods, and the method of presentation. 
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Marx intended to write a short book on method once he had finished Capital. In 1858, he wrote 
to Engels that this text would comprise 2 or 3 printers’ sheets, i.e., between 32 and 48 printed 
pages, and present “the rational aspect of the method in Hegel’s Logic” (Marx to Engels 16 
January 1858; MECW 40, p. 249). Ten years later, in 1868, following the publication of the 
first volume of Das Kapital, he wrote to Dietzgen that, “when I have shaken off this economic 
burden, I shall write a ‘Dialectic’. The correct laws of the dialectic are already contained in 
Hegel, although in a mystified form. They must be stripped of this form” (Marx to Joseph 
Dietzgen, 9 May 1868, MECW 43, p. 31).1 Marx had previously made several passing 
comments on method, starting in the 1840s, and he would pen others, including an afterword 
to the second German edition of Capital (1873) and his marginal comments on Wagner’s 
textbook on political economy (1879-80) (Marx 1975). Yet there are few extended discussions 
of method, let alone a coherent overview, in his published work, making it harder to discern 
Marx’s method of research and how he used the dialectic (Gamble & Walton 1972; Sayer 1979; 
Beamish 1992; Jánoska, Bondeli, Kindle, & Hofer 1994; Germer 2001; Arthur 2004; Pepperrell 
2011; Hanzel 2014, 2015; Moseley & Smith 2014). 
 
This article focuses on changes in Marx’s account of his method between the preparation of 
the incomplete 1857 Introduction to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy and 
the writing of the Preface to the first edition of Das Kapital, vol. I, which was published in 
1867. This interval was the period of maximum production in Marx’s preparatory work for 
Capital, with c3150 pages compared with c750 draft pages over the next 15 years (Dussel 1990, 
see Figure 1 below). It was also the time when Marx settled on his method of presentation 
(Darstellungsweise) as well as the basic plan for Capital. 
 
According to Rosdolsky (19[6]8: 27),2 the definitive plan for Capital was announced 
by Marx in a letter to Engels from 1865. However, this plan had been established 
during the writing of the Economic Manuscript of 1861-1863, as evidenced in the 
section “The revenue and its sources,” where Marx exposes the complete logical 
system of Capital. In fact, many important questions were set during this period, and 
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only then would Marx write and re-write his work in a way that resulted in the three 
complete volumes (de Paula et al., 2012, p. 171). 
 




These ten years are crucial, then, for exploring important changes in Marx’s understanding of 
his scientific method. He was especially proud of this approach, claiming that the composition 
of the whole argument in Capital would be hailed as a triumph of German scholarship 
(Wissenschaft, or disciplined scientific study) (Marx to Engels, 20 February 1866, MECW 43, 
p. 232). It is worth stressing Marx’s description of Capital and its organic character in the light 
of the assertion that there is only one science. This is the science of history, “the history of 
nature and the history of men [sic]”, which included their co-evolution “so long as men exist” 
(Marx & Engels 1975, pp. 28-9n). For, as is now increasingly acknowledged, Marx’s interest 
in nature and the natural sciences had profound implications for his developing critique of 
political economy and, indeed, political ecology (on the latter, see, especially Saito 2017). 
 
Marx and the Natural Sciences 
 
Writing on nineteenth-century scientific development, Friedrich Engels noted that Ludwig 
Feuerbach (*1804-†1872) “had lived to see all three of the decisive discoveries — that of the 
cell, the transformation of energy, and the theory of evolution named after Darwin” (1990, p. 
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372). In more detail, and in Engels’s order of presentation, which matches their historical 
sequence in Western Europe, these scientific breakthroughs comprise: 
 
First, “the discovery of the cell as the unit from whose multiplication and differentiation the 
whole plant and animal body develops” (Engels 1990, p. 385). This discovery was initially the 
joint work of Matthias Schleiden and Theodor Schwann, who had worked respectively on plant 
cells and animal cells, and discovered that the two kinds of cell shared the same properties. 
They presented their findings in Mikroskopische Untersuchungen über die Übereinstimmung 
in der Struktur und dem Wachstum der Thiere und Pflanzen (1839, translated into English in 
1847, reprinted in 1910). It inspired other work on cell biology, physiology, metamorphosis, 
and metabolism, including by Ernst Haeckel, another leading German cell biologist, who was 
also an ardent supporter of Darwin. Marx and Engels were familiar with Schleiden and 
Schwann and other work on these topics. 
 
Second, the law of the transformation and conservation of energy established implies that “the 
transformation of energy, which has demonstrated to us that all the so-called forces operative 
in the first instance in inorganic nature — mechanical force and its complement, so-called 
potential energy, heat, radiation (light, or radiant heat), electricity, magnetism, and chemical 
energy — are different forms of manifestation of universal motion, which pass into one another 
in definite proportions so that in place of a certain quantity of the one which disappears, a 
certain quantity of another makes its appearance and thus the whole motion of nature is reduced 
to this incessant process of transformation from one form into another” (Engels 1990, p. 385). 
 
Third, “the proof which Darwin first developed in connected form that the stock of organic 
products of nature environing us today, including man, is the result of a long process of 
evolution from a few originally unicellular germs, … these again have arisen from protoplasm 
or albumen, which came into existence by chemical means” (Engels, 1990, pp. 385-6). 
 
Engels’s statement about Feuerbach also holds for Marx (*1818-†1883), who was interested in 
contemporary science and tried to keep up-to-date with advances in many fields. Engels had 
already referred to the first two discoveries in a letter to Marx on 14 July 1858, when he referred 
to cell theory and thermodynamics; and Marx in turn had written excitedly about Darwin’s new 
book on the Origin of the Species in a letter to Engels on 13 December 1859 (Engels to Marx, 




The most familiar of these discoveries for most Marxist commentators is the third in the 
sequence, namely, Darwin’s theory of evolution. His Origin of Species was published in 
English in the same year as Marx’s Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy) and had a far bigger impact, including in Germany, than Marx’s 
work of that year (Marsden 1999, pp. 102-104). Marx praised it highly and considered it to 
have achieved in natural history what he and Engels had realised for the domain of human 
history.3 His comments on Darwin during the period that he was preparing Capital have 
focused attention on this discovery. In addition, Marx considered, half seriously, that Darwin 
had introduced the class struggle into nature with his account of natural selection. More 
significantly, in the Preface to the first German edition of Capital I, Marx wrote that, for him, 
“the evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history” 
(1996, p. 10; cf. afterword to second German edition, 1996, p. 18). He proceeded to identify 
analogies between natural selection and the evolution of tools and technology in the division 
of labour (Marx 1996, p. 346; cf. pp. 489-913). He also interpreted competition as a crucial 
mechanism of natural selection in relations among those “hostile brothers”, individual 
capitalists, in whose competition, “one capitalist kills many” (Marx 1998, p. 252; Marx 1996, 
p. 750; cf. Moseley 2002).4 He commented, probably semi-seriously, on “natural selection” in 
the labour force (1996, pp. 274-5); and he almost certainly drew his contrast between a bee’s 
hive-building capacities and the achievements of the worst architect from Darwin’s discussion 
of hive-bees’ “inimitable architectural powers” (Darwin 1859, pp. 227-8; Marx 1996, p. 188). 
 
The influence of the second discovery, the transformation of energy, has been recognized more 
recently. This occurred through examination of Marx’s Exzerpthefte (excerpt notebooks) from 
the 1850s and his published and unpublished drafts of Capital rather than because of Marx’s 
public pronouncements or correspondence. Its significance emerged through his analysis of the 
transformative power of the steam engine in industrial production and his reading of texts on 
labour-power (Wendling 2009). The growing unification of theories about energy embraced 
animal and human physiology – another topic on which Marx made extensive notes. An 
important result of this discovery for Marx is his discussion of Arbeitskraft, translated as 
labour-power, the capacity or potential to perform living labour – a concept that was absent 
from classical political economy. According to Rabinbach, it was not Marx but Hermann von 
Helmholtz who originated the term (Rabinbach 1990, p. 46). Von Helmholtz extended the 
scope of the term “Kraft” beyond its original context, where it described the forces unleashed 
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by machines that converted chemical or heat energy into mechanical energy, to describe all of 
nature, including human labour, in terms of this sort of conversion. Rabinbach further notes 
that, “[w]ith this semantic shift in the meaning of ‘work,’ all labor was reduced to its physical 
properties, devoid of content and inherent purpose. Work was universalized” (1990, p. 47). 
Marx regarded his concept of labour-power as one of two “best points” about Capital, because 
it allowed him to describe the two-fold character of labour once it is divided into concrete and 
abstract labour (Wendling 2009, p. 52; citing Marx to Engels, 24 August 1867, MECW 42, p. 
407). In this context, while concrete labour refers to specific modes of expending human 
labour-power (cf. Marx, 1996, pp. 52-55), abstract labour refers to the common quality of 
different kinds of human labour in the abstract (1996, p. 71). The abstract character of labour 
power is continually rebased through innovation and competition and becomes socially 
necessary labour time in specific spatio-temporal contexts (Postone 1993). Temporality and 
(ir)reversibility were also key emerging themes in thermodynamics at the time (expressed in 
the notion of entropy) and crucial to Marx’s exploration of the political economy of time. 
 
The first scientific discovery, that of the cell as the unit from whose multiplication and 
differentiation the whole plant and animal body develops, is the least remarked of the 
influences on Marx’s critique of political economy. This is probably because its history is less 
known or because commentators have missed its significance. For, on the one hand, Marx 
mentions the economic cell form (Zellenform) or germ form (Keimform) only once each and 
elementary form (Elementarform ) twice in the 3 volumes of Kapital compared with the more 
generic notion of simplest form (einfachste Form) (13 times); and, on the other, he employs 
many other analogies, metaphors or references drawn from the natural sciences. For example, 
Stoffwechsel (metabolism), first developed, as John Bellamy Foster notes, in the 1830s by 
scientists engaged in cellular biology and physiology and then applied to chemistry (notably 
by Justus Liebig) and physics (Foster 2013), occurs 28 times in Kapital’s 3 published volumes. 
The concept is also applied metaphorically in the discussion of conversion and reconversion 
of different moments of the capital relation (commodity, money, etc.) in its expanded 
reproduction. Thus, there are over 1300 references in Kapital I-III to Verwandlung 
(conversion) and Rückverwandlung (reconversion), which are key terms in cell metabolism and 
thermodynamics alike. In addition, cell biology tends to be subsumed into Marx’s more general 
interest in physiology and its relevance to anthropology and land economy. 
 
Yet the influence of cell theory on Marx’s work is hidden in plain sight. For, in the Preface to 
7 
 
the first German edition of Das Kapital, Marx wrote: 
 
The value-form, whose fully developed shape is the money-form, is very elementary 
and simple. The human mind has for more than 2,000 years sought in vain to get to the 
bottom of it all, whilst on the other hand, to the successful analysis of much more 
composite and complex forms, there has been at least an approximation. Why? 
Because the body, as an organic whole, is more easy [sic] of study than are the cells 
of that body.5 In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor 
chemical reagents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both. But in 
bourgeois society, the commodity-form of the product of labour — or value-form of 
the commodity — is the economic cell-form. To the superficial observer, the analysis 
of these forms seems to turn upon minutiae. It does in fact deal with minutiae, but they 
are of the same order as those dealt with in microscopic anatomy (1996, pp. 7-8, italics 
added). 
 
2. Method in Political Economy 
 
This discussion of method highlights the importance of epistemology as well as ontology. In 
the same text, Marx wrote: “every beginning is difficult, holds in all sciences” (1996, p. 7). 
This could be an indirect reference to Hegel’s concern in the Science of Logic with “the 
difficulty of finding a beginning in philosophy”, especially as, for Hegel, this was also a 
science, indeed, a pure science (reines Wissen) (Hegel 1998: 67; cf. 2010, p. 28). For Marx, 
however, regarding Capital, it refers in the first instance to the difficulties that he anticipated 
that his readers might have with the opening chapters (ibid.), which he felt obliged to rework 
several times and across different editions. And, regarding the more general critique of political 
economy, it could well refer to the difficulties that the Physiocrats and their opponents found 
in establishing the starting point of political economy. For, as Marx observed in the Grundrisse: 
 
The crucial issue was not what kind of labour creates value but what kind of labour 
creates surplus value. They were thus discussing the problem in a complex form before 
having solved it in its elementary form; just as the historical progress of all sciences 
leads only through a multitude of contradictory moves to the real point of departure 
(1987b, p. 297). 
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The progress of Marx’s quest for an entry-point also involved many contradictory moves. Thus, 
his comment could also refer to his own difficulties in finding the right starting point for his 
critique of the categories, practices, and dynamic of political economy. Indeed, he spent several 
years looking for the best entry-point for his critique before he identified the commodity as the 
elementary form of the capital relation, which, as such, could provide the starting point for his 
critique. His initial critique, of Hegel’s philosophy of law, began with the separation between 
state and civil society (1842-3); money was highlighted in The Holy Family, 1844, as well as 
the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844); then, with Engels, he turned to the social 
relations of production and reproduction in the materialist conception of history (German 
Ideology, 1845-6); revisiting capitalism, money once again became a key social relation 
(Poverty of Philosophy 1847); the 1857 Introduction returned to civil society; then Marx looked 
behind money to exchange relations (Grundrisse); and he finally settled on the commodity 
(Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy and the opening chapters of Das Kapital). 
 
In addition, these challenges concerned not only the method of research but also the method of 
presentation that was appropriate for reproducing the real-concrete as a concrete-in-thought 
(see below). A fortiori, they also concerned the interweaving of phases of research, drafting, 
and final editing. And these in turn are obviously conditioned by the ontological assumptions 
about the object of inquiry – the real-concrete as it appears to the senses and is transformed 
into an object of scientific analysis. In this regard, of course, Marx adopted a materialist 
approach as opposed to the idealist approach favoured by Hegel. He discussed both approaches 
in general terms in his 1857 Introduction and, in addition, juxtaposed two methods of inquiry 
in political economy that ultimately do not seem to have been decisive in writing Capital. 
 
The first method starts with a real and concrete precondition of production that remains an 
empty phrase, amounting to a chaotic conception of the whole, until it has been decomposed 
into its simplest determinations and then recomposed, this time as “a rich totality of many 
determinations and relations” (1986a, p. 37). This approach corresponds to the “descending” 
method of political economy in the 17th century and is illustrated by William Petty’s Political 
Arithmetyk (1690) (Marx 1986a, p. 37). Early Political Economy took population as its 
“comprehensive” starting point in the real world – a category that was the most visible form in 
which the object of national economics appears. It then aimed to reproduce this “real starting 
point” in thought “as a synthesis of many determinations” (1986a, p. 38). While focusing on 
political economy, Marx criticized Hegel’s phenomenology. Specifically, he attacked Hegel’s 
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idealist premises, which take the real starting point as the product of the thinking mind rather 
than as having an existence “outside the mind and independent of it” (1986a, pp. 38-9). 
 
The second method takes the simplest (or most abstract) element of a specific mode of 
production as its point of departure. It then explores the historical presuppositions of this 
element (its “concrete substratum”), the historical development of this elementary form into its 
most abstract expression; and its articulation with other elements to form more complex 
moments of production. It may also seek to show how more complex moments can be derived 
logically, with due recognition of historical contingencies, from the simple, elementary form 
that is chosen as the starting point. This “ascending” approach is characteristic of Classical 
Political Economy, as exemplified in Adam Smith’s synthetic method in The Wealth of 
Nations. While praising Smith’s theoretical breakthroughs, Marx criticized his treatment of 
bourgeois categories as universal or transhistorical and, relatedly, his emphasis on the formal 
rather than material aspects of capitalist production. The German nonetheless proposed to adopt 
the ascending approach in his critique of political economy. He aimed to identify the historical 
differentia specifica of the capitalist mode of production (hereafter CMP) vis-à-vis the elements 
common to production in general (a rational abstraction).  
 
Marx illustrated this approach from Hegel’s philosophy of law, which began by analysing 
possession as the simplest legal relation. Next, referencing Adam Smith, he considers labour 
(not, be it noted, labour-power) as the simplest element identified in classical political economy 
and comments on the historical conditions in which “labour as such” (rather than specific kinds 
of labour) can become an abstract starting point for the analysis of modern political economy 
as labour becomes “a means to create wealth in general” (1986a, pp. 39-42). This anticipates 
the distinction between concrete and abstract labour (see below). After presenting the general 
abstract determinations that characterize all forms of society, attention must turn to “the 
categories which constitute the internal structure of bourgeois society and on which the 
principal classes are based” (1986a, p. 45). Next comes a progressive movement from more 
abstract-simple to more concrete-complex categories, culminating in the world market. 
 
While Marx indicated his preference in the Introduction for the second method of inquiry, he 
did not follow it to the letter in subsequent texts on capital. Instead he chose the commodity as 
the simple, elementary, or most abstract starting point for his analysis rather than labour or 
other core categories mentioned in the Introduction. Commodities are mentioned only once in 
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the 1857 introduction and in relation to commodity prices rather than the commodity form. In 
contrast, money is referenced 11 times, capital in different forms appears 28 times, and labour 
and wage-labour together figure around 50 times (Marx 1986a: 17-44). The Grundrisse (1857-
8) effectively begin with Chapter 2, on money, which ends rather than begins with some 
remarks on the commodity, and then moves to Chapter 3, on capital, which is ten times longer 
than that on money. In contrast, the commodity as the Elementarteil (“elementary unit”), 
“elementary existence”, or “simplest concrete form” of the capitalist form of wealth is the first 
topic of chapter 1 in Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859), followed by a 
chapter on money, with the expected chapter on capital being absent from the published 
version. This is also the starting point, of course, of the first volume of Capital. This could well 
be because labour-power cannot be the starting point because, whether it is regarded as an 
actual commodity or as a fictitious commodity, the commodity form would have to be taken 
for granted, rather than analysed. So, the commodity is logically prior to labour-power and 
must be considered before attention turns to the two special commodities: money and labour-
power.6 
 
Table 1 suggests that Marx adopts a third method in Capital compared with the various 
preparatory manuscripts. This method is indebted to the example of cell biology, which led 
Marx to take the simplest element of the CMP as his starting point: this does not mean that 
Marx employed the cell metaphor or analogy slavishly in a pseudo-scientific transfer of its 
concepts and mechanisms to the capital relation. But his reading of cell biology does seem to 
have affected the substance of his argument as well as its starting point. The substance is, of 
course, an unfolding of the value form of the commodity as the presupposition and posit of the 
unfolding dynamic, contradictory character, and inherent crisis-tendencies of the capital 
relation. As Roberto Fineschi notes, the commodity provides the ideal starting point because it 
is not abstract content but a unity of form and content. Specifically: 
 
... the economic cell must at the same time express the universal character of the 
content and the formal determinacy it assumes in the capitalist mode of production. 
The commodity seems to respond to this need: this is the criterion for choosing it [as 
1) the starting point]. 2) Its ability to represent at the most abstract level possible the 
unity of material content and social form is not, however, enough to characterize [the 
commodity as] the economic cell: it must contain, potentially, in itself, the exposition 




Table 1: From the 1857 Introduction to Das Kapital, Vol 1 (1867) 
 
 1857 Introduction Kapital I <1867> 
 Method 1 Method 2 Marx’s Method 
Example Early Political Economy Classical Political Economy 




Chaotic conception of the 
whole as it appears at first 
sight to a naïve observer 
Decomposition of the 
whole by an informed 
theorist into analytically 
distinct but connected 
parts 
Identify the ultimate 
morphological element 
that is also the nucleus of 
all further development 
Initial 
object 
The real-concrete Several abstract-simple elements The simplest element 
Method 
Descending analysis into 
constituent elements to 
better grasp the whole 
Ascending synthesis to 
create rich totality that 
reproduces real-concrete as 
a concrete-in-thought 
Logical-historical analysis 
of dialectical relations 
between the simplest 
element as both 
presupposition and posit of 
the whole 
 
Source: Jessop (2018) 
 
This excludes both the one-sided descending and one-sided ascending methods of Early and 
Classical Political Economy. It requires a unique combination of (1) logical analysis based on 
“the force of abstraction” (Marx, 1996, p. 8) to identify the simplest social relation of the CMP 
that can be linked in potentia, by virtue of its inherent contradictions, to other bourgeois social 
relations such that what is initially an immediate presupposition becomes, as the presentation 
reaches its conclusion, is revealed as the product of the capital relation as an organic whole; 
(2) historical analysis of the genesis of specific economic and social forms and their changing 
significance in different contexts; and (3) attention to the empirical details of relevant 
contemporary examples of the CMP to identify emergent tendencies and/or demonstrate the 
plausibility of logical arguments. This can be described, controversially perhaps because of its 
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negative connotations in other theoretical contexts, as a “logical-historical method” (for a 
defence of this term against various critiques of other usages, see Jessop 2018). 
 
3. The Commodity as Starting Point 
 
What happened, then, between 1857 and 1867 to prompt Marx to begin Capital with the 
commodity rather than one or more of the economic categories that received far more attention 
in the 1857 Introduction, namely, wage-labour, value, money, price, and capital? An obvious 
answer might be, as indicated above, that the commodity is logically prior to these specific 
forms of the capital relation and that it must therefore be presented first. Moreover, given that 
wealth in capitalist social formations presents itself (appears) as an immense accumulation of 
commodities, it also corresponds to Hegel’s suggestion in the Science of Logic that this science 
should begin with the immediate (1998, pp. 67-72, 77-78; cf. 2010, pp. 27, 40, 134).7 In 
addition to occasional remarks in correspondence and hints in the excerpt notebooks, we have 
four main sources for explaining this choice: Marx’s Preface to the first German edition (1867); 
different editions of Volume I (1867-83); the initially unpublished “Chapter 6: Results of the 
Direct Process of Production” (1864), which intended to link Volumes I and II; and Marx’s 
“Marginal Notes on Adolph Wagner’s Lehrbuch der politischen Oekonomie” (1879-80). 
 
Let us begin with the Marx-Engels correspondence. On 14 July 1858, Engels wrote to Marx: 
 
One has no idea, by the way, of the progress made in the natural sciences during the 
past, 30 years. Two things have been crucial where physiology is concerned: 1. the 
tremendous development of organic chemistry, 2. the microscope, which has been 
properly used only during the past 20 years. This last has produced even more 
important results than chemistry; what has been chiefly responsible for revolutionising 
the whole of physiology and has alone made comparative physiology possible is the 
discovery of the cell—in plants by Schleiden and in animals by Schwann (about 1836). 
Everything consists of cells. The cell is Hegelian “being in itself” and its development 
follows the Hegelian process step by step right up to the final emergence of the 
“idea”—i.e. each completed organism (MECW 40, p. 326). 
 
This observation could have been a trigger, especially as Marx acknowledges in a letter written 
on 4 July 1864, that, in the natural sciences, Engels is always ahead of him and “I always follow 
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in your footsteps” (MECW 41, p. 546). As this letter also indicates, he certainly begun reading 
extensively in histology, cell biology, physiology, and related disciplines. 
 
This exchange occurred in the year after Marx penned the 1857 Introduction. It may explain 
why, in contrast to its focus on method in political economy, the 1867 Preface highlights 
method in the natural sciences and their interest in the micro-foundations of macro-level 
phenomena. This would hold for cell biology, thermodynamics, and Darwin’s theory of 
evolution among other fields of inquiry. Specifically, in an allusion to the newly burgeoning 
field of histology and its accompanying cell theory or cell doctrine, Marx mentions the role of 
microscopy and chemical reagents (staining agents for making tissue structures more visible). 
 
Marx then presents “mikrologische Anatomie” (where micrological refers to the analysis of 
phenomena at a microscopic scale) as the model for his point of departure, with a view to 
moving from the commodity as the economic cell-form of the CMP through the process of cell 
formation, differentiation, repetition (simple reproduction), and growth (expanded 
reproduction or accumulation) to provide a complete account of the whole organism formed 
by a social formation dominated by the CMP. Moreover, as Marx also noted, because 
microscopy cannot be applied in the analysis of social forms, it must be replaced by “the force 
of abstraction” (1996, p. 8). Abstraction is not a purely logical procedure. It must relate to the 
object of inquiry. In the case of Marx’s critique of political economy, it is guided by the case 
of England’s capitalist development up to the 1860s as the closest parallel to physicists’ 
observation of natural processes where they exist in their most typical (prägnateste) form with 
the least external disturbance and/or to their conduct of experiments in conditions that isolate 
the normal case (in German, rein or pure) (1996, p. 8). Later, Marx will show growing interest 
in France as an instantiation of finance capital and in the USA as a site of even more advanced 
forms of the capital relation regarding the enterprise form and finance. 
 
I now present six key propositions in cell theory that could have inspired Marx. These 
propositions draw on texts in cell biology, physiology, histology, and so on, that Marx and 
Engels were likely to have known directly or indirectly: 
 
1. All living organisms – plants and animals alike – are composed of one or more cells 
(Schwann 1847). Or, as Virchow put it: “the cell is really the ultimate morphological 
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element in which there is any manifestation of life, and … we must not transfer the seat 
of real action to any point beyond the cell” (1858, p. 3; 1860, p. 3). 
2. Following from this, the cell is the most basic unit (Elementarteil) of life (Schwann 
1847). 
3. Cells lead independent lives that, at least in animals, are shaped by the life of a larger 
organism of which they are part (ibid.). 
4. Omnis cellula e cellula, i.e., “every cell arises from another cell” (Virchow 1855, 23; 
1860, 27). 8 
5. Cellular reproduction depends on metabolic exchanges with the environment (including 
other cells) that convert food/fuel into energy to run cellular processes, create the 
building blocks for cell formation, and eliminate waste. 
6. Embryonic cells can – but need not – differentiate into other kinds of cell, generating 
the higher order forms (specialized tissues, organs) that comprise a functioning 
organism.9 
 
These points find parallels, conscious or unconscious, in Marx’s analysis of the commodity, 
the circuits of capital, and the differentiation of different moments of the value-form and other 
categories of the capital relation. Here I draw on the preparatory works to Capital, different 
editions of Capital, and the comments on Wagner. Thus: 
 
1. The living organism or Gesellschaftskörper (social body) of the CMP depends on the 
dynamic arrangement of the value form and its cognate forms into concrete-complex 
relations (Marx 1987a; 1996). 
2. The elementary unit (Elementarteil) of the value form is the commodity (1996, p. 45), 
which is also the economic cell form (Zellenform) of the CMP (1996, p. 8). 
3. Commodities lead independent lives that are shaped by the life of the CMP of which 
they are a part – they are both presupposition and posit of both simple and expanded 
reproduction (see below). 
4. Omnis merx e mercibus, i.e., every commodity from commodities.10 This can take the 
form of simple commodity circulation, i.e., C-M-C, or of the circuit of capital, with the 
potential for expanded reproduction, i.e., M-C-M’). As Marx wrote, “[i]n capitalist 
production of products as commodities, on the one hand, and the form of labour as 




5. Production, distribution, and exchange are analysed as metabolic processes, examining 
how different elements are converted into each other and how a “metabolic rift” can 
produce pathological effects in the overall production process as it unfolds in time-
space (see especially Foster 2000; Saito 2017). 
6. Embryonic contradictions in the commodity as cell form (or germ form) of the value 
relation generate further developments in the capital relation. These include the initial 
two special commodities (labour-power and money as universal equivalent), the price 
form, money as capital, and so on. For example, the commodity form of value “is a 
mere germ form (Keimform), which must undergo a series of metamorphoses before it 
can ripen into the price form” (1996, p. 72).11 More generally, contradiction is the 
generative mechanism that drives the metamorphosis of the value form and of capitalist 
societalization. 
 
One possible reason for taking the commodity as the starting point for a critique of the 
categories, social relations, and dynamic of social formations in which the CMP is dominant is 
that Marx identified an essential contradiction in this cell-form. This was the contradiction-in-
unity of use-value and exchange-value in the value-form of the commodity. On this basis, he 
unfolded the complex dynamic of the CMP – including the necessity of periodic crises and 
their creatively destructive role in renewing accumulation. 
 
While the first two points need no elaboration here, the other four points do merit discussion. 
 
Ad 3, the simple commodity is the presupposition of distinctive capitalist forms. Marx therefore 
proceeded from “the simplest social form in which the product of labour presents itself in 
contemporary society, and this is the ‘commodity’” (1975, p. 544). On this basis, Marx could 
then explore the “double life” of the commodity: as a commodity (which nonetheless 
presupposes that other commodities exist) and as an integral part of the CMP’s overall logic. 
As he wrote in the Grundrisse: 
 
If in the fully developed bourgeois system each economic relationship presupposes the 
other in a bourgeois-economic form, and everything posited is thus also a premiss, that 
is the case with every organic system. This organic system itself has its premisses as a 
totality, and its development into a totality consists precisely in subordinating all 
elements of society to itself, or in creating out of it the organs it still lacks. This is 
16 
 
historically how it becomes a totality. Its becoming this totality constitutes a moment 
of its process, of its development (1986b, p. 208). 
 
Similar arguments are presented in the original draft of the chapter on money for Contribution 
to the Critique of Political Economy (1987c, p. 497). In addition, in the 1861-63 Manuscript, 
Marx writes: 
 
It is as such a prerequisite that we treat the commodity, since we proceed from it as the 
simplest element in capitalist production. On the other hand, the product, the result of 
capitalist production, is the commodity. What appears [erscheint] as its element is later 
revealed to be its own product. Only on the basis of capitalist production does the 
commodity become the general form of the product and the more this production 
develops, the more do the products in the form of commodities enter into the process 
as ingredients (1989a, p. 301; cf. Marx 1996, p. 376). 
 
Ad 4, regarding the proposition that every commodity stems from commodities, Marx argued 
in the unpublished Chapter 6 (written in 1864) that: 
 
Commodities, i.e. use value and exchange value directly united, emerge from the 
[labour] process as result, as product; similarly, they enter into it as constituent 
elements. But nothing at all can ever emerge from a production process without first 
entering into it in the form of the conditions of production (1989a, pp. 387-8, final 
italics mine). 
 
Ad 5, highlighting metabolic conversion in the unpublished chapter 6, Marx wrote: 
 
The conversion of money, which is itself only a converted form of the commodity, into 
capital only takes place once labour-power [Arbeitsvermögen] has been converted into 
a commodity for the worker himself. … Only then are all products converted into 
commodities, and only then do the objective conditions of each individual sphere of 
production enter into production as commodities themselves (1989a, p. 359). 
 
There are many similar comments in the preparatory and actual texts of Capital. Indeed, as 




Ad 6, the commodity form is the common principle of development for other social forms. As 
the opening lines of the first German edition state: 
 
Der Reichthum der Gesellschaften, in welchen kapitalistische Produktionsweise 
herrscht, erscheint als eine "ungeheure Waarensammlung", die einzelne Waare als 
seine Elementarform. Unsere Untersuchung beginnt daher mit der Analyse der Waare 
(Marx MEGA2 II.5 Kapital I 1867, p. 17, italics in original) 
 
[The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, appears 
as an ‘immense collection of commodities’ and the individual commodity appears as 
its elementary form. Our investigation begins accordingly with the analysis of the 
commodity (my translation, italics in original)] 
 
Marx repeats this point in his 1879-80 comments on Wagner’s Lehrbuch der politischen 
Oekonomie: 
 
What I proceed from is the simplest social form in which the product of labour presents 
itself in contemporary society, and this is the “commodity.” This I analyse, initially in 
the form in which it appears. Here I find that on the one hand in its natural form it is a 
thing for use, alias a use-value; on the other hand, a bearer of exchange-value, and 
from this point of view it is itself an “exchange-value.” Further analysis of the latter 
shows me that exchange-value is merely a “form of appearance,” an independent way 
of presenting the value contained in the commodity, and then I start on the analysis of 
the latter. … Thus I do not divide value into use-value and exchange-value as opposites 
into which the abstraction “value” splits up, but the concrete social form of the product 
of labour, the “commodity,” is on the one hand, use-value and on the other, “value,” 
not exchange value, since the mere form of appearance is not its own content (1975, p. 
544). 
 
In this sense, the value form of the commodity contains the embryonic contradiction that 
becomes the germ form (Keimform) of other contradictions. All forms of the capital relation 
can be unfolded dialectically from the value-form of the commodity, considered as the unity 
of exchange-value and use-value, as a unity of [historical] form and [universal] content. So, 
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Marx soon moves from the commodity to two of its special forms: first, labour-power (which 
also has a dual character as use-value and exchange-value and is also explored in terms of its 
dual character as concrete labour and abstract labour) (cf. Marx 1975, p. 546); and, second, 
money as the universal commodity, which is later analysed in terms of its metamorphosis into 
capital. Later Marx will explore another special commodity: land as private property and forms 
of rent (Marx 1998). In these and other cases, the commodity is the simple concretum from 
which all other forms can be derived through a combination of logical reflection and historical 
analysis (a logical-historical approach) in order, eventually, to reproduce the real-concrete as a 
concrete-in-thought, as “a rich totality of many determinations and relations” (1986a, p. 37). 
This argument recalls Hegel’s Science of Logic, which begins with the immediate, simplest, 
most concrete notion and then reconstructs it so that, “although it is something thought, even 
abstract, the rational is at the same time something concrete, because it is not a simple, formal 
unity, but a unity of distinct determinations” (2010, p. 132). 
 
Igor Hanzel develops this argument persuasively in a recent analysis. He suggests that the 
commodity as a germ form is the equivalent of Hegel’s elementary form: 
 
Why did Marx take this method from Hegel? The answer is, at least in my view, that 
Marx saw the strength of Hegel’s method as proved by the fact that the latter employed 
it successfully in the construction of network integrating over two hundred 
philosophical categories. So, at least in my view, Marx could have viewed this method 
as suitable also for the construction of his network of categories of political economy. 
This network, according to my first tentative count, integrates at least 30 such 
categories. … Since Marx applied the cyclical feature of the method of ascent from the 
abstract to the concrete in Capital, it may seem that he made an attempt, like Hegel, at 
the creation of a network of categories as a purely self-justifying system. However, as 
shown above, Marx’s network is, due to the methods employed in its construction, 
open to the theoretical treatment of new economic facts (Hanzel 2015, p. 436). 
 
The Commodity as the Economic Stem-Cell Form? 
 
As a dedicated lay follower of advances in the natural sciences, had he lived long enough, Marx 
would have learnt about stem cells within two decades of the first publication of Das Kapital. 
The key ideas were formulated in Germany in the 1870s and 1880s and finally confirmed 
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experimentally in the 1890s. The term appears in the scientific literature as early as 1868 in the 
works of the German biologist, Ernst Haeckel, who was also active as a second-generation12 
“scientific materialist”, a current condemned by Karl Marx because it invoked science, 
including cell biology and Darwinism, in its attacks on scientific socialism (see Mitchell 1978). 
Haeckel originally employed Stammzelle to describe the unicellular ancestor of all multicellular 
organisms (Haeckel, 1868, 1874), later extending the term to describe the fertilized egg that 
gives rise to all cells of the organism (Haeckel 1877)13 (see Ramalho-Santos & Willenbring 
 
Source: prepared by Catherine Twomey for the National Academies, Understanding Stem Cells: An  Overview of 
the Science and Issues, http://www.nationalacademies.org/stemcells. Academic non-commercial use is permitted. 
 
Figure 2: The Dual Character of Stem Cells 
 
2007). Then, adopting Haeckel’s term, Theodor Boveri demonstrated that stem cells were 
carriers of germ plasm and were the starting points for embryological development of 
differentiated body cells as well as germ cells. Boveri’s noted that stem cells had both a 
capacity for self-renewal and a capacity for differentiation (Maehle 2011, p. 11). Interestingly, 
it may not have been necessary to wait even two decades. For the general idea of stem cells 
was already implicit in the six key arguments from cell theory that were summarized above 
 
Thus, given the cumulative knowledge about cells and stem cells, it is tempting to speculate 
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that, thus informed, Marx might well have described the commodity as the “economic stem-
cell form” of capitalist social formations. It is now recognized that stem cells reproduce 
themselves through simple repetition but are also pluripotent, having the capacity to form very 
different kinds of cell with different properties and functions (see Figure 2). Likewise, the 
value-form of the commodity can be seen from two perspectives: as the elementary unit of the 
capital relation that reproduces itself through the circuit of capital and as a pluripotent stem 
cell that can differentiate [logically and/or historically] into many other special forms of the 
capital relation that are often essential to its expanded reproduction. The first perspective 
concerns either simple commodity production, which takes the form of C-M-C, or the 
metamorphosis (metabolism) in the circuit of capital in the form of M-C-M’. The second 
perspective – the pluripotency of the commodity form – indicates how the elementary 
contradiction in the value-form of the commodity between use- and exchange-value leads to 
differentiation. In addition to wage-labour and money, Marx discusses many other forms of the 
capital relation and the wider capitalist social formation (regarded here as an ensemble of 
forms). These also have their own specific properties, contradictions, and impact on the 
expanded reproduction of capital and the organic character of capitalist social formations. 
While the stem-cell metaphor enables these arguments to be stated more clearly, they were 
already implicit in cell theory as it existed in 1857-1867, when Marx was drafting Capital. 
Thus, the heuristic power of the stem cell analogy depends less on its capacity to restate Marx’s 
arguments that its capacity to generate further insights. 
 
For example, without drawing on this metaphor, I have proposed that the contradiction at the 
heart of the value-form of the commodity has parallels in other forms of the capital relation. 
They embody different but interconnected versions of this basic contradiction. They also 
impact differentially on (different fractions of) capital and on (different categories and strata 
of) labour at different times and places Thus, productive capital is both abstract value in motion 
(notably in the form of realized profits available for reinvestment) and a concrete stock of 
already invested time- and place-specific assets in the course of being valorized; the worker is 
both an abstract unit of labour-power substitutable by other such units (or, indeed, other factors 
of production) and a concrete individual (or, indeed, collective workforce) with specific skills, 
knowledge and creativity; the wage is a cost of production and a source of demand; money 
functions as an international currency exchangeable against other currencies (ideally in 
stateless space) and as national money circulating within national or plurinational spaces 
subject to state control; land functions both as rent-generating property (based on the private 
21 
 
appropriation of nature) and as a more or less renewable and recyclable natural resource 
(modified by past actions); knowledge is the basis of intellectual property rights and a 
collective resource (the intellectual commons). Likewise, the state is not only responsible for 
securing key conditions for the valorization of capital and the reproduction of labour-power as 
a fictitious commodity but also has overall political responsibility for maintaining social 
cohesion in a socially divided, pluralistic society. Taxation is an unproductive deduction from 
private revenues (profits of enterprise, wages, interest, and rents) and a means to finance 
collective investment and consumption (Jessop 1983, 2002, and 2011). The tension between 
the two co-existing poles, each of which is a naturally necessary or inherent feature of a given 
contradiction and, indeed, together define it in their opposition, generates strategic dilemmas 
on how to handle the contradiction. It also provides, as Marx noted more generally regarding 
the metamorphosis of the circuit of capital, the abstract possibility of crises in these different 
moments of the capital relation (see Marx 1989b, pp. 138, 143-4, and, more generally, pp. 130-




… the role of Marx’s dialectics was also to grasp a structured totality where each 
element depends on its relation to other elements and the whole. Since the totality of 
these relationships cannot be presented immediately the first difficulty is where to 
begin. Marx begins, in Part One, with the ‘commodity’ and its inner dialectical 
opposition between use-value and value, and then posits the ‘value-form’ as peculiar 
modality through which this contradiction is exhibited. From here all that is 
presupposed – all of the relations of capital as a whole – is progressively posited. So, 
although value presupposes capital, value itself begins as an empty concept, in the 
sense that the complex determinations and relationships that constitute capital have 
yet to be analysed and presented (Taylor & Bellofiore 2004, p. 12, italics added) 
 
Nicola Taylor and Riccardo Bellofiore’s extended comment can be related to Marx’s 
suggestion that ‘the body, as an organic whole, is more easy of study than are the cells of that 
body’ (see above). The challenge is to relate the two within the organic whole. This involves 
considering the logic of discovery, the role of self-clarification, and the method of presentation. 
At most I would claim that cell biology is relevant to the logic of discovery, suggesting ways 
to link the commodity to the capitalist mode of production as the organic totality. Recognizing 
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the limits of reducing investigation of the social world to the logic of the natural sciences 
(whilst noting the unity of the natural and social worlds), it would make little sense to derive 
and develop the analysis of the CMP through strict analogical unfolding. Indeed, Marx was 
harshly critical of attempts to take analogies out of context. This was the basis of his criticisms 
of the German “scientific materialists” of his time, who sought to derive immediate political 
conclusions from the discoveries of nineteenth-century natural science, to which some of them 
were influential contributors. For example, at a time when the natural-scientific materialists 
were supremely popular in Germany, Marx directed an aside in Volume 1 of Capital at what 
he called “abstract materialism”. He wrote: 
 
The abstract materialism of a natural science which excludes the historical process is 
defective, as we can see in a moment when we glance at the abstract and ideological 
conceptions voiced by its advocates whenever they venture beyond the bound of their 
own speciality (Marx 1996, pp. 375-6n).14 
 
He made a similar point in another context in a letter to Engels: 
 
It is plain to me from this one note that, in his second grand opus, the fellow [i.e., 
Ferdinand Lassalle] intends to expound political economy in the manner of Hegel. He 
will discover to his cost that it is one thing for a critique to take a science to the point 
at which it admits of a dialectical presentation, and quite another to apply an abstract, 
ready-made system of logic to vague presentiments of just such a system. (Marx to 
Engels, 1 February 1858, MECW 40, p. 261, my italics.) 
 
It follows that the method of research and the method of presentation must be substantively as 
well as formally adequate to the object of research. This was indicated in the 1857 Introduction 
but even the second method recommended by Marx identified too many starting points in the 
real-concrete. Marx’s interest in cell biology provided the breakthrough necessary to find the 
unique, singular starting point from which other concepts could be unfolded and that would 
permit an eventual return to the commodity as a presupposition to show how it was also a posit, 
the necessary effect of the overall logic of an organic whole. This was also the method in 
Hege’s science of logic. The difference is that Marx started with the real – the commodity – 






1 Cited in Beamish, 1992, pp. 1-2. 
2 De Paula et al. give the date as 1948; this is an error. 
3 Marx read The Origin of Species three times, from mid-November to mid-December 1860, in 
early to mid-June 1862, and in French sometime before mid-February 1869 (Sheasby 2004, p. 
68). 
4 Marx to Engels: “It is remarkable how Darwin rediscovers, among the beasts and plants, the 
society of England with its division of labour, competition, opening up of new markets, 
“inventions” and the Malthusian “struggle for existence”” (18 June 1862, MECW 41: 381). 
5 Kölliker’s Gewebelehre (Histology) opens with two remarks: microscopic anatomy 
(mikroskopische Anatomie) is now just as much one of the foundations of medicine as the 
anatomy of the organs and systems; and a basic study of physiology and pathological anatomy 
is impossible without exact knowledge of the most minute form relations (1852: iii, my 
translation). His book surveys the elementary parts (Elementartheile) of the body and the finer 
construction (Bau) of organs (1852, iii). 
6 Hegel wrote in the preface to the second edition of the longer Logic: “Thoroughness seems to 
require that the beginning, as the foundation on which everything is built, should be examined 
before anything else, in fact that we should not go any further until it has been firmly established 
and if, on the other hand, it is not, that we should reject all that follows” (1998, p. 41). 
7 “The definition with which any science makes an absolute beginning cannot contain anything 
other than the precise and correct expression of what is imagined to be the accepted and 
familiar subject matter and aim of the science” (Hegel 1998, p. 49). Hegel continued: “because 
that which forms the beginning is still undeveloped, devoid of content, it is not truly known in 
the beginning; it is the science of logic in its whole compass which first constitutes the 
completed knowledge of it with its developed content and first truly grounds that knowledge” 
(p. 72). This is also the case with Marx’s method of presentation in Capital. 
8 Omnis cellula e cellula is attributed to François-Vincent Raspail (e.g., Florkin 1969; Harris 
1999, pp.32-33; Bechtel 2006, p. 72n) but I have not found direct textual evidence for this. He 
did write that “the plant cell, like the animal cell, is a kind of laboratory of cellular tissues, 
which organize and develop themselves at its heart” (Raspail, 1833, p. 516, my translation, 
italics added). This might indicate omnis cellula e cellula (cf. Frobert 2011; Klein 1981). 
Virchow introduced the notion in an article in 1855; but it is not in the first German edition of 
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his book, although the idea is present (1858, p. 25). He originally wrote omnis cellula a cellula 
– modifying it to “e cellula” in an interpolation in the second edition, from which the English 
translation cited here was made (1860, p. 27). 
9 Schwann, for example, identified five types of human tissue that could emerge from an 
embryonic cell. 
10 Cf. Sraffa’s analysis of the production of commodities by means of commodities (1960). 
11 Cf. McCarthy on the commodity as the “simplest category”, the “Keimform” (or germ form), 
that “contains within itself the totality of all forms of capitalist social structure and their 
contradictions of the capital relation” (1988, pp. 115-16). 
12 Cf. On Haeckel as a second-generation scientific materialist, see Gregory (1997, p. x).  
13 This book was translated by E. Ray Lankester, a natural scientist who was a friend of Marx 
and Engels and attended Marx’s funeral. 
14 „Die Mängel des abstrakt naturwissenschaftlichen Materialismus, der den geschichtlichen 
Prozeß ausschließt, ersieht man schon aus den abstrakten und ideologischen Vorstellungen 
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